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Robotics and the Lessons of Cyberlaw 
Ryan Calo* 
Two decades of analysis have produced a rich set of insights as 
to how the law should apply to the Internet’s peculiar characteristics. 
But, in the meantime, technology has not stood still. The same public 
and private institutions that developed the Internet, from the armed 
forces to search engines, have initiated a significant shift toward 
developing robotics and artificial intelligence. 
This Article is the first to examine what the introduction of a 
new, equally transformative technology means for cyberlaw and 
policy. Robotics has a different set of essential qualities than the 
Internet and accordingly will raise distinct legal issues. Robotics 
combines, for the first time, the promiscuity of data with the capacity 
to do physical harm; robotic systems accomplish tasks in ways that 
cannot be anticipated in advance; and robots increasingly blur the 
line between person and instrument. 
Robotics will prove “exceptional” in the sense of occasioning 
systematic changes to law, institutions, and the legal academy. But 
we will not be writing on a clean slate: many of the core insights and 
methods of cyberlaw will prove crucial in integrating robotics and 
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INTRODUCTION 
The law found the Internet unsettling. That a buyer in one location could 
access the website of a seller in any other forced courts to revisit basic 
questions of jurisdiction and federalism.1 The potential to share and edit 
software and other digital objects introduced novel questions of ownership and 
control.2 In the mid-1990s, a movement arose among legal academics to 
address these and similar challenges. Known by the name cyberlaw, its central 
tensions flow from the essential qualities of the Internet, by which I mean the 
characteristics that distinguish the Internet from prior or constituent technology 
such as computers or phones. 
Some early cyberlaw questions have seen a kind of resolution in the 
twenty years since the rise of cyberlaw. Legislatures and courts have weighed 
in,3 and the vigorous debate has continued—around “net neutrality,” for 
instance, and the impossible puzzle that is privacy.4 But even here, participants 
have at least a sense of the basic positions and arguments. 
 
 1. See infra Part I.B. 
 2. See infra Part I.B. 
 3. See, e.g., Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) 
(holding that free speech protection extends to the Internet and invalidating, in part, the 
Communications Decency Act of 1996). 
 4. E.g., Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (invalidating the antidiscrimination 
and antiblocking rules under FCC’s Open Internet Order); Daniel J. Solove, Introduction: Privacy 
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Law, in other words, is catching up. But technology has not stood still. 
The same military that funded the early network that became the Internet now 
funds robotics competitions.5 The same household-name Internet companies 
that brought us search engines and social networks have begun a large-scale 
pivot toward robotics and artificial intelligence.6 State and federal lawmakers 
are authoring laws around the domestic use of drones and issuing license plates 
to cars without drivers.7 
Robotics is shaping up to be the next transformative technology of our 
time. And robotics has a different set of essential qualities than the Internet. 
Robotics combines, arguably for the first time, the promiscuity of information 
with the capacity to do physical harm.8 Robots display increasingly emergent 
behavior, permitting the technology to accomplish both useful and unfortunate 
tasks in unexpected ways.9 And robots, more so than any technology in history, 
feel to us like social actors—a tendency so strong that soldiers sometimes 
jeopardize themselves to preserve the “lives” of military robots in the field.10 
The essential qualities of robotics will drive a distinct conversation. We 
think of the Internet as a powerful tool for people to communicate. Robotics 
blurs the very line between people and instrument. If the United States does not 
maintain sufficient control over its autonomous submarines, perhaps the 
submarines are not “vessels” entitled to passage through Chinese waters under 
international law.11 If a defendant injures a person while trying to vandalize an 
anthropomorphic robot rather than a wall, transferring intent arguably furthers 
the purposes of criminal and tort law. These are not scenarios about which 
cyberlaw has much to teach. 
 
Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1880 (2013) (canvassing 
contemporary issues in privacy). 
 5. See infra Part II. 
 6. See infra Part II. 
 7. E.g., S.B. 1298, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012) (authorizing autonomous vehicles); 
A.B. 511, 2011 Leg., 76th Sess. (Nev. 2011) (same); S.B. 313, 2013 Leg., 77th Sess. (Nev. 2013) 
(regulating autonomous vehicles); S.B. 1134, 62nd Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2013) (placing limits on 
domestic use of drones); S.B. 1587, 98th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2013) (same); see also John 
Bacon, Google This: Nevada Issues License for Driverless Car, USA TODAY (May 8, 2012, 1:35 
PM), http://content.usatoday.com/communities/ondeadline/post/2012/05/google-this-nevada-issues 
-license-for-driverless-car/1#.VOVPHEKpI9x. 
 8. See infra Part II.B.1. 
 9. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 10. See P.W. SINGER, WIRED FOR WAR: THE ROBOTICS REVOLUTION AND CONFLICT IN THE 
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 337–43 (2009); M. Ryan Calo, The Drone As Privacy Catalyst, 64 STAN. L. 
REV. ONLINE 29 (2011), http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/drone-privacy-catalyst; see also 
Julie Carpenter, Just Doesn’t Look Right: Exploring the Impact of Humanoid Robot Integration into 
Explosive Ordnance Disposal Teams, in II HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON TECHNOSELF: IDENTITY IN 
A TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY 609 (Rocci Luppicini ed., 2013). 
 11. See Craig H. Allen, The Seabots are Coming Here: Should they be Treated as ‘Vessels’?, 
65 J. NAVIGATION 749 (2012). 
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But the parallels are also strong. Drones, no less than the Internet, raise 
questions of speech, innovation, and privacy.12 Courts that struggled for the 
proper metaphor to apply to the Internet will struggle anew with robotics. 
Scholars interested in the way we are hardwired to think of going online as 
entering a cyber “place”13 will also be interested in the way we are hardwired 
to treat social technology as though it were a person.14 Those who consider 
how software constrains human behavior may be interested in the reverse 
question of how people and institutions can manage behavior generated by 
software. One hopes, in particular, that scholars interested in robotics will 
continue in a tradition of interdisciplinary pragmatism that is perhaps 
cyberlaw’s greatest legacy. 
Part I of this Article describes the qualities that characterize and 
distinguish the Internet and traces how these qualities came to disrupt legal 
discourse. Two decades of law and scholarship have resolved, or at least 
clarified, some of cyberlaw’s central tensions. Yet the same public and private 
institutions at the heart of the Internet now direct their attention toward a 
unique and equally transformative technology. 
Part II shows how the mainstreaming of robotics will muddy anew the 
waters, so recently stilled, posing distinct challenges for law and legal 
institutions. This descriptive claim has normative consequences: the better we 
understand how a technology will affect society, the better position we are in to 
integrate the technology gracefully. 
Part III explores whether robotics is legally “exceptional” in the sense of 
meriting new laws, legal institutions, and research methods. The insights, 
methods, and norms of cyberlaw—its deepest lessons15—will prove crucial in 
helping to integrate into society a new transformative technology. Ultimately, 
however, robotics law can and should depart from cyberlaw and form a distinct 
area of governance and study. 
This project involves a degree of guesswork. Herbert Simon, the 
progenitor of behavioral economics,16 wrote a lesser-known series of essays in 
the 1960s on the societal effects of automation. In a preface to a 1965 book 
 
 12. See, e.g., Margot E. Kaminski, Drone Federalism: Civilian Drones and the Things They 
Carry, 4 CALIF. L. REV. CIRCUIT 57 (2013), 
http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1007&context=clrcircuit. 
 13. E.g., Julie E. Cohen, Cyberspace As/And Space, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 210 (2007); Mark 
A. Lemley, Place and Cyberspace, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 521 (2003); Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place 
and the Tragedy of the Digital Anticommons, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 439 (2003) (arguing that the 
“cyberspace as place” metaphor leads to undesirable digital anticommons). 
 14. See infra Part II.B.3. 
 15. Cf. Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV. L. 
REV. 501 (1999) (arguing that cyberspace law has lessons to impart beyond the particulars of 
cyberspace). 
 16. Herbert Simon coined the term “bounded rationality” to refer to the way people act 
rationally in their self-interest, but only to a point. HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF MAN: SOCIAL 
AND RATIONAL 196 (1957). 
2015] ROBOTICS AND THE LESSONS OF CYBERLAW 517 
collecting his thoughts, Simon made no apologies for speculating about how 
computers could overhaul the realm of labor: 
In our kind of world, those who are closest to important new technical 
innovations have a responsibility to provide reasoned interpretations of 
these innovations and their significance. Such interpretations should 
be, of course, the beginning and not the end of public discussion. But 
they cannot be made at all without extrapolation from present 
certainties into future probabilities.17 
Simon went on to distinguish between the technological and economic 
dimension of the analysis. He said of himself that he was “radical” about the 
technology—he believed computers will one day be able to do just about 
everything people can.18 But he was “conservative” about the ramifications.19 
For Simon, even a world pervaded by automation will not necessarily look so 
different from our own, much less necessitate novel economic theories. 
My commitments are just the opposite. When it comes to the technology, 
I find I am conservative: robotics will continue to evolve, but mostly in ways 
that solve known technical challenges and reduce costs.20 You will not find any 
references to HAL or C3PO in the pages that follow. And yet the widespread 
distribution of robotics in society will, like the Internet, create deep social, 
cultural, economic, and of course legal tensions long before the advent of 
science fiction. 
I. 
THE RISE OF THE INTERNET 
Cyberlaw refers to the legal and policy discourse that attends the 
Internet.21 The central themes and tensions of cyberlaw flow more or less 
directly out of a handful of essential qualities: a set of specific characteristics 
that distinguish the Internet from its predecessor and constituent technologies. 
Part I explores what those qualities are and how they interact with law and 
policy. Part II explores how the Internet’s essential qualities and the 
experiences these qualities generate have come to inform specific doctrinal and 
theoretical debates within cyberlaw. 
 
 17. HERBERT A. SIMON, THE SHAPE OF AUTOMATION FOR MEN AND MANAGEMENT vii 
(1965). 
 18. Id. at xii–xiii. 
 19. Id. 
 20. See infra Part II. 
 21. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “cyberlaw” as “[t]he field of law dealing with the Internet, 
encompassing cases, statutes, regulations, and disputes that affect people and businesses interacting 
through computers.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 443 (9th ed. 2009). But see Jacqueline D. Lipton, 
Law of the Intermediated Information Exchange, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1337, 1339 (2012) (“Despite the 
resilience of cyberlaw as a staple in today’s law school curricula, no one has yet accurately explained 
the nature of the field.”). 
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Part I is a prelude to Part II, which performs the equivalent exercise 
prospectively for robotics. Part II asks: If the essential qualities of the Internet 
drive a particular conversation, how will that conversation change with the 
introduction of a distinct transformative technology? The collective thesis of 
these Parts involves a claim as obvious as it is under theorized: much of what 
characterizes an emerging technology as unique also makes it interesting to the 
law. As with the Internet, the breadth and depth of the experiences robotics 
makes possible will determine the contours of any legal discourse. This insight 
turns out to be rather important. An academic and policy-oriented community 
that understands at the outset what challenges a technology poses stands a 
better chance of fashioning a sensible, theoretic, empirical, and (if indicated) 
regulatory agenda. 
A. Definitions 
According to the U.S. Supreme Court, the Internet is “an international 
network of interconnected computers.”22 At a technical level, the Internet 
switches “packets” of data between nodes; it leverages a set of protocols to 
divide digital information into separate containers and to route those containers 
between end points for reassembly and delivery.23 The networks and protocols 
that comprise the Internet constitute, according to the Court, “a unique 
medium—known to its users as ‘cyberspace’—located in no particular 
geographical location but available to anyone, anywhere in the world.”24 The 
Internet originated as a military-funded research network; the government was 
interested in a more resilient set of networks that, unlike a legacy 
telecommunications system, would continue to function if one segment were 
incapacitated.25 The then-ARPAnet originally connected a handful of military 
and university computers.26 This research network eventually became the 
Internet, blossoming into a commercial and cultural juggernaut that touches 
billions of lives every day. 
The Internet sits upon a number of constituent technologies: processors, 
software, switches, and wires.27 It shares certain characteristics with legacy 
modes of communication such as telephone and television. And yet the Internet 
is distinct. The Internet supplants the broadcast model of many to one by 
connecting people and institutions directly to one another in something like real 
 
 22. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849 (1997). 
 23. See TIM WU, THE MASTER SWITCH: THE RISE AND FALL OF INFORMATION EMPIRES 
172–74 (2010) [hereinafter WU, MASTER SWITCH] (discussing how packet switching differs from 
legal telecommunications). 
 24. Reno, 521 U.S. at 851. 
 25. Id. at 850. 
 26. Id. 
 27. See Orin S. Kerr, The Problem of Perspective in Internet Law, 91 GEO. L.J. 357, 360 
(2003). 
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time.28 Relatedly, the Internet supports shared digital spaces and objects that 
facilitate collaborative creation and governance.29 Experiences in cyberspace 
are mediated, meaning they take place through technology.30 The fact of 
common mediation is precisely what enables two people to coexist in a 
common cyberspace, to consume but also “remix” content.31 But, as Joel 
Reidenberg, Lawrence Lessig, and others have catalogued, mediation also 
introduces the prospect of interference, persuasion, or control.32 
Thus, the Internet has at least three hallmarks. First, it allows for 
promiscuous and interactive flows of information (connection). Suddenly, 
anyone on the network can reach anyone/everyone else, often at very low cost, 
and without sensitivity to distance.33 That person can, in turn, respond 
immediately or at a delay. Second, by mediating user experience, the Internet is 
capable of generating shared objects and spaces (collaboration).34 People can 
“meet” on a website and comment or alter the text, pictures, videos, software, 
or other content they find there. Finally, the Internet allows for additional or at 
least more exquisite forms of observation and manipulation than offline 
analogs (control).35 The architecture of networks and interfaces is subject to 
alteration in a way that can greatly constrain human behavior, more and more 
of which is taking place through technology. 
Each of these facets of the Internet ends up, alone or in combination, 
forming the basis for one or more central tensions in cyberlaw. The free flow of 
information enables new forms of peer production and governance, while 
simultaneously introducing or exacerbating threats to intellectual property and 
privacy. The Internet stitches communities together, but conflicts invariably 
burst out at the seams. The Internet invokes a distinct sense of a place with new 
possibilities and norms, but simultaneously introduces methods of exquisite 
control by organized private and state interests. The remainder of this Part runs 
through a nonexhaustive sampling of examples of Internet-specific legal issues, 
touching upon jurisdiction, intermediary liability, digital property, copyright, 
free speech, and privacy, among other challenges. 
 
 28. Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of 
Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 6–9 (2004). 
 29. Id. See generally JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET AND HOW TO 
STOP IT (2008). 
 30. See YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION 
TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 392 (2006) (discussing how the Internet mediates human 
communication). 
 31. See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX: MAKING ART AND COMMERCE THRIVE IN THE 
HYBRID ECONOMY (2008) [hereinafter LESSIG, REMIX]. 
 32. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0 (2006) [hereinafter LESSIG, CODE 2.0]; Joel 
R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules Through Technology, 
76 TEX. L. REV. 553 (1998). 
 33. Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and What It Will Do, 104 YALE L.J. 1805 (1995). 
 34. See supra text accompanying notes 28–30. 
 35. See supra note 32. 
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B. Law Meets the Internet 
Perhaps the simplest way the Internet disrupts the status quo is by 
connecting individuals and institutions cheaply and without sensitivity to 
distance. This difference is, I think, largely quantitative: people could invite 
and carry on conversations by mail or telephone, just not with speed or at scale. 
Nevertheless, the law found the massive and cheap interconnectivity of the 
Internet plenty challenging. 
Jurisdiction presented an early and salient example. The Internet is 
famously ambivalent about boundaries.36 Thus, a citizen with a website in one 
state could delight or defraud a citizen in any other. But for a state to exercise 
jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant, consistent with constitutional 
principles of due process, that defendant must have “purposefully avail[ed] 
itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State.”37 The 
question whether Internet activity constitutes purposeful availment quickly 
landed before a federal court. In Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, 
Inc., the question was whether operating a website accessible in Pennsylvania 
was enough to permit a California corporation to be sued there for violation of 
state and federal trademark law.38 The Zippo Dot Com court found that an 
“interactive” website like the defendant’s was sufficient to anchor jurisdiction, 
whereas a “passive” website that merely presented information would not be.39 
Some courts to confront this issue followed Zippo Dot Com’s reasoning; others 
have struck different balances.40 
A related set of questions attends choice of law and enforcement. In 
Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme, for instance, 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit faced the question of whether to 
enforce a French judgment against the Internet company Yahoo!41 The case 
involved Yahoo!’s decision to permit the sale of Nazi paraphernalia as well as 
hate speech on its website, accessible in France, in apparent contravention of 
French law.42 In the United States, such a decision, however unwise or 
offensive, is protected under the First Amendment.43 But whose law should 
apply to a company located in the United States yet facilitating sales in 
Europe? The Yahoo! court, sitting en banc, issued a complex, splintered 
opinion countenancing the prospect of invalidating a French order as repugnant 
 
 36. See DAVID G. POST, IN SEARCH OF JEFFERSON’S MOOSE: NOTES ON THE STATE OF 
CYBERSPACE 163–65 (2009) [hereinafter POST, NOTES]. 
 37. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 
U.S. 310, 319 (1945)). 
 38. 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1121 (W.D. Pa. 1997). 
 39. Id. at 1124. 
 40. See, e.g., M. Shamsuddin v. Vitamin Research Prods., 346 F. Supp. 2d 804, 813 (D. Md. 
2004); see also id. at 810–11 (citing cases and law review articles critical of Zippo Dot Com). 
 41. 433 F.3d 1199, 1201 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 42. Id. at 1202. 
 43. Id. at 1220. 
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to public policy while determining the question was not ripe for review: “First 
Amendment issues arising out of international Internet use are new, 
important[,] and difficult,” the court said. “We should not rush to decide such 
issues based on an inadequate, incomplete[,] or unclear record.”44 
There are issues even within the same jurisdiction. The Supreme Court 
decided relatively early in the Internet’s history that free speech principles 
apply with equal vigor in cyberspace.45 But free speech principles do not apply 
equally across all contexts, even offline. Thus, for instance, courts have 
repeatedly encountered the question of whether speech originating outside of 
the school could form the basis for punishment: a fake social network profile of 
a principal was not grounds for state action in Layshock v. Hermitage School 
District,46 whereas the threatening electronic messages at issue in Wynar v. 
Douglas County School District were.47 Adventurous scholars would take this 
melding of contexts further, for instance into the realm of employment.48 
The Internet does more than connect disparate contexts; it creates its own 
sense of place. We are almost hardwired to think of websites or virtual worlds 
as places we visit, places that in turn contain the digital equivalent of objects.49 
The first, fortuitous consequence of this quality is that people can collect 
somewhere to engage, share, and create.50 More than simply connected, we 
find ourselves commonly mediated.51 
This communal property of the Internet generates new possibilities for 
governance, or so scholars have argued. Cyberlaw pioneers such as David Post 
and David Johnson hold that the Internet is best understood as a separate 
sovereign, beholden to no particular nation.52 Others, notably Michael 
Froomkin, explore how the Internet supports democracy by “mak[ing] possible 
the construction of new communities of shared interest.”53 The hope—
periodically reaffirmed—is that the Internet provides the tools to discuss and 
evaluate ideas and norms, and even to arrive at civic consensus.54 At a 
minimum, the Internet enables groups to organize around particular political 
concerns. 
 
 44. Id. at 1223. 
 45. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997) (“[O]ur cases provide no basis for qualifying the 
level of First Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to this medium.”). 
 46. 650 F.3d 205, 207 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 47. 728 F.3d 1062, 1075 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 48. See Mary Anne Franks, Sexual Harassment 2.0, 71 MD. L. REV. 655 (2012). 
 49. See Hunter, supra note 13, at 443 (canvassing the literature and finding that “cognitive 
science investigations provide ample evidence that, purely as a descriptive observation, we do think of 
cyberspace as a place”). 
 50. See generally BENKLER, supra note 30. 
 51. Id. at 392. 
 52. See David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders—The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 
48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996). 
 53. A. Michael Froomkin, Habermas@Discourse.net: Toward a Critical Theory of 
Cyberspace, 116 HARV. L. REV. 749, 856 (2003). 
 54. See, e.g., ZITTRAIN, supra note 29, at 223–28 (espousing “code-backed norms”). 
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The Internet also democratizes the market. Whereas we once gathered by 
the radio and television to take in whatever happened to be broadcast, we now 
select from a wide variety of media capable of delivering information in myriad 
ways.55 And there is far more agency over the information we receive. The 
Internet permits novel forms of social production—or, more colloquially, it 
supports a “remix” culture of individuals and institutions as avid and adept at 
transforming content as they are at consuming it.56 People in the Internet age 
discover, but also shape news; they purchase, but also comment upon goods 
and services;57 they watch, but also edit and create art and entertainment. 
Together we collectively curate a torrent of content that increasingly blurs the 
line between professional and amateur.58 
I have so far only described one side of the proverbial coin. Common 
mediation opens exciting new paths for communities but also invites exquisite 
new forms of surveillance and control. Many of the central debates among 
policymakers, industry, activists, and academics involve understanding 
precisely who can exert control over these shared spaces and objects, over the 
network and other “layers” of technology that underlie them, or over the 
information each generates.59 Control is a way to understand key topics in 
cyberlaw, including intellectual and virtual property, net neutrality, and 
privacy. 
One of the central issues of cyberlaw deals with the limits of 
cyberproperty—how much control firms can maintain over the services they 
offer. An early and influential case, CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, 
Inc., involved whether one actor could trespass on the (nonland) property of 
another merely by sending uninvited electronic communications.60 The 
CompuServe court blessed a theory that became known as electronic trespass to 
chattels.61 In other instances, courts and prosecutors have interpreted the 
Computer Fraud Abuse Act of 1986 to impose civil or criminal liability on 
individuals or firms that violate a website’s terms of service, which govern the 
 
 55. See Balkin, supra note 28, at 6–7. 
 56. See LESSIG, REMIX, supra note 31. 
 57. See Scott R. Peppet, Freedom of Contract in an Augmented Reality: The Case of 
Consumer Contracts, 59 UCLA L. REV. 676, 679 (2012). 
 58. One reason we see more remixing today is because there exist powerful and inexpensive 
tools for editing. I would argue, however, that no one would necessarily invest in developing those 
tools were it not for the demand the Internet creates. Developers would also have a harder time 
disseminating their software. 
 59. See ZITTRAIN, supra note 29, at 67–71; see also DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL 
PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE DIGITAL AGE (2004); BARBARA VAN SCHEWICK, 
INTERNET ARCHITECTURE AND INNOVATION (2010). 
 60. 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1021 (S.D. Ohio 1997). 
 61. See Hunter, supra note 13, at 483–88. Some courts followed and even expanded this 
theory. See, e.g., eBay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1069 (N.D. Cal. 2000). 
Others imposed limits. See, e.g., Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296, 299 (Cal. 2003). 
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relationship between website and user, if in doing so they cause one of several 
types of harm.62 
Other issues center around the control content owners should be able to 
exert over intellectual property. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 
strives to balance the speed and scale of the Internet ecosystem with a concern 
over promiscuous sharing of copyrighted material.63 Copyright law protects 
platforms from primary liability and thereby attempts to remove their 
incentives to be overly censorial of user content.64 Nevertheless, some find the 
tactics of content owners aggressive in policing their rights against consumers 
and peer-to-peer services. The Act contains controversial provisions that 
criminalize attempts to circumvent access controls, so-called digital rights 
management, even where the fair use or first sale doctrines would otherwise 
permit the desired use of the copyrighted work.65 
These and similar concerns have lead various scholars—Dan Hunter, 
James Boyle, and Julie Cohen, for example—to worry aloud about the 
pernicious effect of an over-alienable Internet.66 Though perhaps inevitable to a 
degree, thinking of cyberspace as a place imports a stifling, inefficient, or 
otherwise undesirable tendency to enclose information—to lock it away. We 
risk a “tragedy of the digital anticommons,” to paraphrase Hunter.67 Others 
have defended the notion of cyberproperty with equal vigor, noting that the 
“dire predictions about the effects of such an approach on the shape of the 
Internet have not come to pass.”68 
Another example of the control debate is “network neutrality” or “non-
discrimination.”69 Initially, the Internet was set up to be a dumb, impartial 
conduit of information.70 Increasingly, however, the Internet service providers 
that connect us claim the right to manage traffic on their network by slowing 
down or blocking certain services, or imposing extra fees for high traffic 
applications like video. Other intermediaries, notably Apple, block competitor 
 
 62. See Andrea M. Matwyshyn, The Law of the Zebra, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 155, 165–68 
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 64. Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)(1) (2012). 
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 66. See Hunter, supra note 13; James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the 
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see also Lawrence Lessig, The Architecture of Innovation, 51 DUKE L.J. 1783 (2002). 
 67. Hunter, supra note 13. 
 68. Patricia L. Bellia, Defending Cyberproperty, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2164, 2171 (2004). 
 69. See Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. ON TELECOMM. & 
HIGH TECH. L. 141, 145–46 (2003); see also Susan P. Crawford, The Internet and the Project of 
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applications on their popular phone and tablet platforms.71 Proponents of non-
discrimination argue in favor of regulatory intervention that would prevent 
intermediaries from leveraging their control over the network or market 
dominance to squash innovation by competitors. Detractors—including, 
curiously, otherwise avid proponents of “permissionless innovation”72—
believe market forces provide an adequate check against abuse.73 
A final example is privacy. Information privacy has long been, at one 
level or another, about control. Early discussions focus on how little control 
consumers or citizens are able to maintain over their personal information in 
the digital age.74 The Internet’s connectivity, coupled with the pervasiveness of 
cheap sensors, means that a discrete transgression or moment of intimacy can 
“go viral,” sometimes with devastating results.75 The Internet tears down 
practical barriers to accessing technically public information.76 The fact that 
firms mediate Internet activity, coupled with vanishingly low storage costs, 
also means that consumers and citizens leave a digital trail for hackers, firms, 
and governments to follow.77 Much law and scholarship explores these harms 
and how best to mitigate them.78 
But more recent scholarship focuses on a different form of control: the 
control that holding information about a consumer, citizen, or institution 
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& TECH. L. REV. 367, 368 (2012); Julie E Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the 
Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1379 (2000) (“Data privacy advocates seek . . . to guarantee 
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 75. See generally SOLOVE, supra note 59. 
 76. See Harry Surden, Structural Rights in Privacy, 60 SMU L. REV. 1605 (2007). 
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Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393 (2001); see also M. Ryan Calo, Against Notice 
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permits.79 Intermediaries meticulously study the personal data they gather by 
virtue of providing a service, and they possess monetary incentives to use the 
information in problematic ways.80 More worrisome still, or at least more 
broadly worrisome, is the ability of the government to reach every nook and 
cranny of digital space, and the growing tendency among public institutions to 
share information and use it in ways that disadvantage people or groups.81 This 
new conversation deals in power and asymmetry, bringing to bear a diverse 
array of methodologies from behavioral economics to constitutional and 
postmodern theory. 
A mere sampling, these examples show how the Internet’s essential 
qualities of connection, community, and control end up driving a particular 
conversation across a wide swath of cyberlaw issues. 
II. 
THE RISE OF ROBOTICS 
The essential qualities of the Internet, and the experiences these 
characteristics generated, led more or less directly to a specific legal discourse 
we know collectively as cyberlaw. Several of these discussions are ongoing. 
The various stakeholders have yet to resolve how much control Internet service 
providers should be able to maintain over their network.82 The Computer Fraud 
and Abuse Act, thought of at the time as a “[m]easured response to a growing 
problem,”83 continues to draw withering criticism as excessively protective of 
digital property rights.84 The discussion of online privacy remains vivid.85 
Other questions have been largely answered. Mark Lemley remarks, for 
instance, upon the agility of courts in applying the traditional due process 
framework to Internet jurisdiction.86 He cites to the dormant Commerce Clause 
and free speech as areas in which “courts have demonstrated their ability to 
adapt to the virtual world.”87 We have also seen some ingenious socio-legal 
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and technological fixes such as Creative Commons and Content ID that provide 
copyright holders and consumers with greater flexibility.88 
Even unsettled questions begin to take on a more mature and formal 
structure. The definition of, and best framework for, innovation sits at the heart 
of many cyberlaw debates.89 The conversation tends toward a cost-benefit 
analysis of open versus closed systems and the role of government and markets 
in policing against abuse.90 There are outliers, but conversations in privacy tend 
to coalesce along particular lines: a conversation that began around an 
individual’s control over her own information has evolved into a conversation 
about the control information has over individuals by whomever holds it. Any 
participant in these debates is familiar with the basic arguments and starting 
positions—the universe of proverbial “moves.” One feels in the discussion a 
certain clarification and stabilization. Each new wine from the vineyard of 
cyberlaw has a familiar taste. 
Let me be clear: I do not mean to suggest that cyberlaw has somehow run 
its course, or that the qualities that make the Internet unique are no longer 
relevant. David Post could well be right to speculate, “[T]he Internet gets more 
interesting, more valuable, and more transformative moving forward, making 
these questions of law and governance themselves more interesting, and more 
important, over time.”91 I am suggesting, rather, that the Internet is much more 
familiar and mature today than it once was, and that the twenty or so years 
legal and other academics have spent studying the Internet have paid the 
dividends of structure and clarity that one would hope. 
Yet even as the hungry background of life absorbs the Internet, another 
technology ascends in its place. It is becoming increasingly obvious that 
advances in robotics will come to characterize the next several decades. The 
mainstreaming of robotics is not as sudden as it might seem. Artists and 
hobbyists—early harbingers of the computer revolution—have turned to 
robotics in droves.92 The Department of Defense, having provided the kernel of 
interest and funding to spur the commercial Internet, soon turned to a new 
project. Ten years ago, in the Mojave Desert, some of the same universities that 
operated the first nodes of the ARPAnet found themselves competing to build 
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vehicles capable of navigating a course without human intervention.93 This was 
the DARPA Grand Challenge, the first of many robotics competitions for prize 
money put forward by the U.S. military.94 As Peter Singer chronicles, the 
Armed Forces itself has invested massively in ground, air, and sea robotics in a 
bid to remake warfare.95 
The private sector has been busy as well. The same household-name 
companies that have come to dominate the Internet have pivoted toward 
robotics and its constituent technologies. As of this writing, the Internet search 
giant Google has purchased at least seven robotics or artificial intelligence 
companies for sums totaling in the billions.96 This is after the company 
revealed a fleet of well-tested driverless cars. Amazon, the online marketplace, 
purchased a robotics company to help automate its many warehouses for $775 
million and in late 2013 announced a plan to deliver some packages by drone.97 
The former editor in chief of Wired Magazine, arguably the publication of 
record for the digital revolution, left the magazine to found a robotics 
company.98 Capital that once flowed exclusively to software is returning to 
hardware. Today there are several venture capital funds devoted to robotics 
start-ups.99 Law firms, including the largest labor law firm in the world, have 
entire practice groups around robotics and artificial intelligence.100 
This is not the first wave of excitement over robotics. For a time in the 
1980s it seemed that America had caught robot fever. The difference between 
then and now is twofold. First, the cost of sophisticated robotics has dropped 
considerably. Perhaps the most vivid example is Microsoft’s development of 
the Kinect, a platform that packages a suite of sensors with powerful motion-
modeling software.101 Widely adopted by amateur and professional roboticists 
alike, the Kinect dramatically reduces the cost of one of the more expensive 
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components of robots. Second, and relatedly, roboticists have embraced an 
open ecosystem that permits individuals and firms to build on another’s 
work.102 The Kinect comes with a set of software development tools (a 
software development “kit” or SDK) that supports the ability of third parties to 
build and share applications for the device.103 Companies have developed 
competing robot operation systems and amassed large databases of vision, 
mobility, manipulation, and other code in an effort to jumpstart the industry.104 
So I join a chorus of voices, from Bill Gates105 to the White House,106 that 
assumes that robotics, the next transformative technology after computers and 
the Internet, represents an idea whose time has come. Robotics, meanwhile, has 
a different set of essential qualities. These qualities, and the experiences they 
generate, occasion a distinct catalogue of legal and policy issues that 
sometimes do, and sometimes do not, echo the central questions of 
contemporary cyberlaw. Against the backdrop of Part I, Part II unpacks these 
emerging challenges. Part II.A defines robotics and makes the case for what 
distinguishes robots and artificial intelligence from previous and constituent 
technologies. Part II.B explores the issues that result from these distinguishing 
features, noting again the breadth of possibilities and pausing on several case 
studies for deeper analysis. 
One important caveat: various authors have imagined a world in which 
robots or software achieve, or at any rate claim, a human-like consciousness.107 
Little in the literature gives me confidence that artificial intelligence will 
approximate human intelligence in the foreseeable future. There are analytic 
and technical reasons to believe robots will never think like people.108 If they 
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did, the sorts of problems conscious machines would present are vastly 
underappreciated. Scholars interested in human-level artificial intelligence have 
a tendency to carve out a specific question they can intelligibly address. 109 But 
that is cheating. 
A thought experiment we might call the “Copy or Vote Paradox” serves 
as an example. Imagine, with James Boyle, that an artificial intelligence 
announces it has achieved self-awareness, a claim no one seems able to 
discredit.110 Boyle examines the difficulty we might face in shutting this system 
down and explores some sensible arguments on either side.111 But why stop 
there? Say the intelligence has also read Skinner v. Oklahoma, a Supreme Court 
case that characterizes the right to procreate as “one of the basic civil rights of 
man.”112 The machine claims the right to make copies of itself (the only way it 
knows to replicate). These copies believe they should count for purposes of 
representation in Congress and, eventually, they demand a pathway to suffrage. 
Of course, conferring such rights to beings capable of indefinitely self-copying 
would overwhelm our system of governance. Which right do we take away 
from this sentient entity—the fundamental right to copy, or the democratic 
right to participate? 
In other words, the kinds of issues that would arise were robots to “wake 
up” are of entirely another order. This Part looks instead at the immediate 
commercial prospects of robotics. As it turns out, even the readily achievable 
(or achieved) properties this Part outlines present interesting and difficult 
challenges for existing legal thoughts and doctrines. 
A. Definitions 
Few complex technologies have a single, stable, uncontested definition. 
Robots are no exception. There is some measure of consensus, however, 
around the idea that robots are mechanical objects that take the world in, 
process what they sense, and in turn act upon the world.113 The utility here of 
the so-called sense-think-act paradigm lies in distinguishing robots from other 
technologies. A laptop with a camera can, to a degree, sense and process the 
external world. But a laptop does not act upon the world. A remote control car 
with a camera senses and physically affects its environment but relies on the 
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human operator for processing. The idea of a robot or robotic system is that the 
technology combines all three.114 
Each of these characteristics of sensing, processing, and acting exists on a 
spectrum. Some robots sense the world but little. The gaming platform 
Sphero—a programmable robot ball—can sense orientation and distance from 
the gamer as well as note when the ball itself is being shaken or moved.115 
Other robots can leverage data from any sensor. A sophisticated research 
platform such as the PR2 from Willow Garage comes equipped with dozens of 
sensors, including video, audio, range, pressure, and acceleration, and the 
protocols to integrate them into a complex model of its environment.116 
While well-known robots like the Mars Rover, the Da Vinci surgical 
robot, and the infamous Predator B drone are substantially teleoperated in that 
a human being sees what the machine sees and controls its movements, these 
systems also “think” to a limited degree. The Mars Rover, for example, has 
self-directed modes and will not necessarily take certain actions suggested by 
NASA, like drive off a Martian cliff, if doing so will imperil the robot.117 The 
Da Vinci integrates what it sees with doctor input in a continuous effort to 
improve precision and safety.118 Pilots can fly some military drones simply by 
clicking on a point on a map and letting the drone get there itself; these systems 
can also fly patterns or land themselves.119 At the other end of the spectrum, 
driverless cars navigate hundreds of thousands of miles of urban, suburban, and 
highway conditions without human intervention. 
Robots can “act” to varying degrees as well—they can possess a greater 
or lesser ability to move around or manipulate the world. But acting invites a 
more fundamental question of definition: Can technology act non-
mechanically? Recall that we are looking here for the ways robots differ from 
longstanding and constituent technologies. If a user interface is the same as an 
actuator, it is not clear how robots are different from smartphones. At the same 
time, visual and auditory interfaces introduce energy into and hence alter the 
human environment. Movies and other stimuli—including social “bots” made 
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of software—can induce a range of emotions and physiological responses.120 
Flashing lights have been known to induce epileptic fits;121 heavy 
concentrations of light can cut metal. You and I sometimes act just by 
speaking, as when we agree to an oral contract.122 
My working assumption is that a system acts upon its environment to the 
extent it changes that environment directly. A technology does not act, and 
hence is not a robot, merely by providing information in an intelligible format. 
It must be in some way. A robot in the strongest, fullest sense of the term exists 
in the world as a corporeal object with the capacity to exert itself physically.123 
But again, I am talking in terms of a continuum. It may well be appropriate to 
refer to certain virtual objects organized to exist in and influence the world as 
robots, especially if they meet the other definitional elements. Imagine a room 
in which there is projected an image of a person who appears to walk around 
the room. The animating program has access to various sensors and speakers 
that, in combination with considerable processing power, allow the program to 
interact with visitors. Imagine further that this room has access to a line of 
credit and can initiate the delivery of takeout food. It would take a somewhat 
arbitrary purism to deny that the system acts upon the world, the room, and the 
people in it. 
A working definition of what it means for technology to act, as opposed 
to inform, is of particular interest to legal analysis. As we will see in the 
Sections that follow, officials and courts will face the line between informing 
and acting more and more, just as scholars have already started to grapple with 
the essential qualities of robotics without acknowledgment of the transition. 
To sum up, robots are best thought of as artificial objects or systems that 
sense, process, and act upon the world to at least some degree. But this is just a 
technical definition, akin to describing the networks and protocols that 
comprise the Internet. What turns out to be important for legal and policy 
discourse is not the precise architecture, but the possibilities and experiences 
the architecture generates and circumscribes. In other words, the debates that 
attend the Internet are not about packet switching as such, but rather the 
massive, asynchronous, and distance-insensitive communication this technique 
permits. The following Section turns from a technical definition of a robot to 
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the essential qualities—embodiment, emergence, and social valence—that 
characterize robotics as a transformative technology. 
B. Law Meets Robotics 
The Internet’s essential characteristics interact with the law in novel ways; 
so, too, will the essential characteristics of robotics. Specifically, as I discuss 
below, the qualities of embodiment, emergence, and social valence will 
challenge the law and legal institutions in years to come. 
Data is not embodied; robots generally are. Sensing, navigating, and 
acting upon the world generally requires a physical presence, and that physical 
presence opens up a universe of new possibilities. Robots execute commands, 
of course, and can be useful merely by repeating a task with inhuman patience, 
or by reproducing an action in hazardous conditions. But the processing 
capabilities of robots translate into the tantalizing prospect of original action. 
The literature tends to refer to this exciting potential as “autonomy” or “true 
learning,” but I prefer “emergence.”124 Emergence refers to unpredictably 
useful behavior and represents a kind of gold standard among many roboticists 
for reasons I will describe. Finally, robots, more so than other technology in 
our lives, have a social valence. They feel different to us, more like living 
agents. The effect is so systematic that a team of prominent psychologists and 
engineers has argued for a new ontological category for robots somewhere 
between object and agent.125 These categories are distinct but mutually 
reinforcing. For instance: a physical embodiment coupled with apparently 
spontaneous action leads people to lend robots social valence. 
Embodiment, emergence, and social valence—alone, and especially in 
combination—turn out to be relevant to an extraordinarily wide variety of legal 
contexts: criminal law and procedure, tort, intellectual property, speech, 
privacy, contract, tax, and maritime law, to name but a few. The remainder of 
this Section proceeds by expanding on the essential or distinguishing qualities 
of robots and their repercussions for law and policy. It hopes to convey with 
examples both the breadth and depth of this interaction. 
1. Embodiment 
We live in a digital age; the availability of information has reshaped, often 
for the better, virtually every human pursuit. Certain qualities of data, as 
discussed above, lend themselves to transformation. For instance, digital 
information is promiscuous—it “wants to be free,” as the saying goes—and 
faces few natural barriers to dissemination.126 The digital age is a collaborative 
 
 124. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 125. See Peter H. Kahn, Jr., et al., The New Ontological Category Hypothesis in Human-Robot 
Interaction, 2011 PROC. 6TH INT’L CONF. ON HUMAN-ROBOT INTERACTION 159. 
 126. See R. Polk Wagner, Information Wants To Be Free: Intellectual Property and the 
Mythologies of Control, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 995, 999 n.14 (2003). 
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one. Jonathan Zittrain refers to personal computers and the Internet, the central 
vehicles of data to date, as “generative” technologies.127 The idea is that 
contemporary software and hardware facilitates individual and collective 
innovation on an unparalleled scale. There are, as we explored, various private 
and public threats to this model; the very mediation that empowers Internet 
users renders them vulnerable to control. And there are downsides even 
where—indeed, because—freedom of information is preserved. Privacy is one 
example; hate speech is another. 
Early in the days of the digital revolution, however, another question 
quickly arose, and was just as quickly answered: What do we do about the 
inevitable instability of these radically generative systems? Confronted with the 
problem of glitch-ridden, multipurpose computers running third-party software, 
courts moved quickly to curb liability.128 Early decisions about software 
liability invoked the economic loss doctrine, limited loss as intangible for 
insurance purposes, and aggressively upheld warranties, all to avoid allocating 
responsibility among the many movers, shapers, and consumers of data.129 
Courts are still acting to domesticate liability in the digital context, but you 
probably would not even think to sue Microsoft or Dell because Word froze 
and ate your manuscript.130 The Internet confronted a similar challenge around 
whether to hold platforms liable for what users do on those platforms. To 
varying degrees, Congress or courts acted to limit liability for most categories 
of user conduct by 1998—early days in the commercial history of the 
Internet.131 
While robotics also relies on data, the mainstreaming of robots signals a 
shift back to the physical. Robots run on software and process sensory and 
other information. Many robotic systems are actually connected to the Internet 
to supplement functionality, or even to run core functions (sometimes called 
 
 127. ZITTRAIN, supra note 29, at 70. By “generative,” Zittrain means “a system’s capacity to 
produce unanticipated change through unfiltered contributions from broad and varied audiences.” Id.; 
see also Jonathan L. Zittrain, The Generative Internet, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1974 (2006). 
 128. E.g., Transp. Corp. of Am. v. IBM, 30 F.3d 953, 960 (8th Cir. 1994) (barring recovery 
under the economic loss doctrine for lost data). For more examples, see Calo, supra note 102, at 598–
61. 
 129. But see Pompeii Estates, Inc. v. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc., 397 N.Y.S.2d 577 (N.Y. 
Civ. Ct. 1977) (refusing to insulate Consolidated Edison for a service termination mistake involving a 
computer). I am grateful to James Grimmelmann for this example. 
 130. See David E. Jordan, The Tortious Computer—When Does EDP Become Errant Data 
Processing?, in 4 COMPUTER LAW SERVICE § 5-1, art. 2, at 4, 8 (Robert Bigelow ed., 1979) 
(acknowledging an “implicit acceptance of the fallibility of computers” and suggesting that computer 
users may be “consciously accepting the risks of defects and operational difficulties in new equipment, 
in preference to delaying purchase until the ‘bugs’ have been worked out”). 
 131. E.g., Communications Decency Act, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, 133–43 (1996) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.); Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 328 
(4th Cir. 1997). 
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“cloud robotics”).132 Robots, however, differ from computers and software 
precisely in that they are organized to act upon the world. The capacity to act 
physically upon the world translates, in turn, to the potential to physically harm 
people or property. 
Obviously the capacity to affect the world physically is not novel in any 
meaningful legal sense. The earliest cases in tort dealt with the physical 
consequences of objects.133 Nor does it necessarily matter that drones or other 
robots permit physical harm at a distance. A bullet shot from land one has 
permission to enter can trespass onto land one does not.134 The question 
whether a drone flying over a backyard below navigable airspace constitutes a 
trespass may be an interesting example in terms of defining property rights 
more precisely,135 but it is not ultimately novel. 
There is, however, a significant difference between a bullet and a robot: 
the prospect of programming. Programming dictates behavior in complex 
ways. Code interacts with other code and various inputs, for instance, operator 
instructions or sensor data. It turns out to be very difficult to predict its 
influence entirely.136 Code can also have complicated origins. Software can 
have one or many authors. It can originate anywhere, from a multimillion-
dollar corporate lab to a teenager’s bedroom. Given that robots run on code, 
anticipating and accounting for robot behavior represents at least as difficult a 
task as accounting for user behavior in the context of personal computers or 
smartphones. You cannot anticipate exactly how a robot will behave by looking 
at it. Indeed, two physically identical robots can behave in radically different 
ways because of small differences in their software. 
Robots thus combine, arguably for the first time, the generative 
promiscuity of data with the capacity to do physical harm.137 This has a number 
of legal repercussions. In her 2013 essay, Nora Engstrom explores how the 
 
 132. See Erico Guizzo, Cloud Robotics: Connected to the Cloud, Robots Get Smarter, IEEE 
SPECTRUM (Jan. 24, 2011, 4:39 PM), http://spectrum.ieee.org/automaton/robotics/robotics 
-software/cloud-robotics. 
 133. The writs of trespass and trespass on the case dealt with direct and indirect injury, 
respectively, of person or property. 
 134. See Herrin v. Sutherland, 241 P. 328 (Mont. 1925). 
 135. Cf. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 266 (1946) (abrogating rule that property 
owners take all land rights above and below property). 
 136. See Richard Mateosian, No More Wishful Thinking, IEEE MICRO, Mar./Apr. 2009, at 68 
(“Testing everything is impossible in a finite amount of time. Furthermore, although testing can 
identify problems, it can’t correct them.” (reviewing GERALD WEINBERG, PERFECT SOFTWARE AND 
OTHER ILLUSIONS ABOUT TESTING (2008))); see also Curtis E.A. Karnow, Liability for Distributed 
Artificial Intelligences, 11 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 147, 162 (1996) (amassing evidence of “inherent 
problems with software liability” and noting that it is “practically impossible to test software 
thoroughly” (citation omitted)). 
 137. As Mark Lemley notes in the context of intellectual property, 3D printing (described 
below) and synthetic biology also combine data promiscuity with physical ramifications. See Mark A. 
Lemley, IP in a World Without Scarcity (Stanford Pub. Law Working Paper No. 2413974, 2014), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2413974. 
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mainstreaming of 3D printers—a close cousin of robotics—stands to interact 
with product liability law.138 3D printing refers to the creation of physical 
objects from code; the technology works by alternatively heating and cooling a 
material such as plastic or metal to create three-dimensional objects according 
to a pattern contained in a software file. Some units are quite affordable and 
can be used in the home.139 3D printing is often linked with robotics in that it 
uses some of the same underlying software and hardware.140 
Under existing doctrine, plaintiffs injured by the products they buy can 
generally avail themselves of strict liability.141 They do not need to show 
negligence. But strict product liability only applies to “[o]ne engaged in the 
business of selling or otherwise distributing products.”142 It is well established 
that noncommercial “sellers” (think handcrafts or lemonade) are only liable for 
defects in products if they were negligent.143 Were individuals to print the 
objects they buy at home instead of picking them up at a store, it is not at all 
clear whether strict liability would apply in the event of an injury. This may be 
fine if we are talking about the equivalent of combining squeezed lemons, 
water, and sugar, where the risk is a sour taste. As access to complex 3D 
designs and materials increases, however, individuals will be in a position to 
create and sell complex, valuable, and dangerous products. 
Arguably there are other ways to establish liability. Many 3D products 
will have been professionally designed. Programming a chair or Lego piece is 
presumably hard enough, much less more complicated products. So what about 
locating liability in the commercial designer of the “print-at-home” product? A 
commercial distributor of, say, microwave popcorn could probably be held 
strictly liable for an injury proximately caused when the bag catches fire in 
minute three. Why not hold liable the designer of the toothbrush that, when 
printed, ends up cutting the gums? In other words, while perhaps we cannot 
hold enterprises strictly liable for a manufacturing defect, perhaps we can hold 
a company with deep pockets liable for a design defect because the product is 
harmful even when properly assembled. 
The issue is that products as understood by contemporary product liability 
law are by definition tangible―intangible products do not generally give rise to 
 
 138. Nora Freeman Engstrom, 3-D Printing and Product Liability: Identifying the Obstacles, 
162 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 35 (2013), http://www.pennlawreview.com/online/162-U-Pa-L-Rev 
-Online-35.pdf. 
 139. Id. at 35. 
 140. The difference is that 3D printers have limited sources of input: the program that supplies 
the pattern, for instance, and the position of the actuator. But they are made up of very similar 
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 141. See Engstrom, supra note 138, at 40. 
 142. Id. at 36 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 1 cmt. c (1998)). 
 143. Id. at 37. 
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product liability actions.144 Thus, a guidebook claiming that a particular beach 
was nice for swimming would not be a product for purposes of an injury from a 
shark bite, nor would an encyclopedia of mushrooms that turned out to be 
wrong about which were poisonous.145 The code conveyed to the consumer 
fails to be defective for purposes of a product liability claim not because it 
lacks defects, but for the antecedent reason that it is not even a product. The 
same may—or may not—prove true of robotics software generally. 
Engstrom’s essay shows how the interaction of product liability law and 
embodiment presents the prospect of systematically undercompensating 
victims. Embodying data also disrupts a more basic distinction between 
informing and acting. Products being sold and under development increasingly 
situate data in the physical world. Truly driverless cars are on their way, but 
driver assistance systems are already organized to act upon the world.146 Lane 
correction features in luxury vehicles range from alerting the driver of a lane 
drift with an expectation the driver will react, to actually providing resistance 
in the steering wheel. Robotic surgery lets surgeons “feel” organs through 
resistance.147 The Tangible Media Group at the MIT Media Lab has developed 
an interface that lets users “reach through” a screen to manipulate objects at a 
distance.148 
Embodiment turns out to challenge a basic compact that underlies the 
digital revolution. Congress and the courts have been in a position to shield the 
 
 144. Id. at 38–39. 
 145. Id. at 39 (citing Winter v. G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 938 F.2d 1033, 1036 (9th Cir. 1991)). 
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 148. See Sean Follmer et al., inFORM: Dynamic Physical Affordances and Constraints 
Through Shape and Object Actuation, 2013 PROC. USER INTERFACE SOFTWARE & TECH. 13, 417. 
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to revisit and perhaps fortify the line between display and force. 
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engines behind the digital economy from significant liability, thereby 
promoting innovation, precisely because information was at issue.149 For 
example, courts have invoked the economic loss doctrine to limit liability for 
data lost pursuant to a computer freezing, even when such data is clearly of 
great value to the aggrieved party. But the economic loss doctrine does not 
apply by its terms to physical harm.150 Indeed, where glitches in software have 
resulted in physical injury, the courts have allowed actions in tort to proceed.151 
Congress has shielded the Internet even more directly: Section 230 of the 
Communications Decency Act of 1996 expressly immunizes Internet platforms 
for what users say there.152 Thus, for instance, the social network Facebook 
will not be held accountable for a fraud committed by one of its many users 
through the service. The Act does so, however, by providing that the platform 
will not be treated as the “publisher” of the offending information.153 Part of 
the rationale was that Facebook should not be thought of as the speaker in these 
and similar instances, nor placed in a position where the company must 
constantly police against its users’ speech on pain of suffering tort or criminal 
liability. Congress will be hard pressed to immunize manufacturers of robotic 
platforms where (a) physical harm can result and (b) the free speech arguments 
that animated Section 230 are not really in play.154 But the need to promote an 
open ecosystem in robotics is no less pronounced.155 
The basic point is this: the law will face the question, maybe soon, and 
likely often, of what to do when a digital object made up of bits becomes a 
physical object made up of atoms. Courts may soften or strengthen existing 
doctrines, import doctrines across subject matter, or resurrect doctrines long 
forgotten—all prospects I countenance in Part III. But the set of compromises 
we have in place today—the balances lawmakers, courts, and regulators have 
struck—will plausibly unwind in the coming decades. 
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2. Emergence 
Today’s robots do a variety of tasks that people could do, but don’t for 
reasons of cost or preference.156 Moving more tasks into the category of 
automation could in and of itself cause legal issues at scale. Imagine, for 
instance, if just one major fast food chain were to automate one or more tasks 
now done by people. Such a shift would move enough company expenditures 
from payroll to capital that most states in America would have to reexamine 
their tax laws.157 I would characterize this change as superficial, however, 
despite the fact that the law would need to undergo deep or systemic changes. 
Adjusting the tax code to accommodate greater automation seems akin to 
having to change antitailgating or texting laws to accommodate driverless cars. 
To this day there are jurisdictions that technically require elevators to have 
seats for the operator;158 we just ignore them. 
Researchers dream of systems that do more than merely repeat 
instructions but adapt to circumstance. Emergent behavior is a clearly stated 
goal of robotics and artificial intelligence, going directly to the “think” 
component of our earlier definition of the technology. Kenneth Anderson and 
Matthew Waxman describe why this capacity would be useful in a military 
setting.159 Robotic systems might be faster than people at reacting to battlefield 
developments, especially ones initiated by other machines.160 As Ronald 
Arkin’s work explores, a machine that is versatile enough to “learn” from 
mistakes could stop itself (and people) from committing those mistakes in the 
future.161 
Emergent behavior turns out to be useful well beyond military 
applications. For example, emergence cuts down on training time: rather than 
designate every behavior with its own block of code, users can set goals and 
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train the system to accomplish them.162 Further, because an emergent system 
learns from previous behavior, it will improve at a task over time even when 
unaided.163 You see this aspiration in a recent demo by Carnegie Mellon and 
Intel of their robotic butler, which appears to try various methods to separate an 
Oreo cookie.164 Importantly, emergent behavior can lead to solutions no human 
would have come to on her own. Something approaching creativity can emerge 
from feeding data into a complex system and allowing it to iterate toward a 
semiarbitrary goal. Thus, the company Gillette reportedly entered various 
parameters into an algorithm with emergent properties, called a “Creativity 
Machine,” which in turn spit out a patentable innovation in toothbrushes.165 
I use the term “emergence” instead of “autonomy” by design. Autonomy 
suggests that robots are somehow making a decision to act in a particular way. 
Little is gained, and much is arguably lost, by pretending contemporary robots 
exhibit anything like intent.166 Instead, I would draw on Stephen Johnson’s 
work in emergence spanning across a number of disciplines. Johnson sees the 
essence of emergence as the coupling of complexity and usefulness, the 
movement of low-level rules to tasks of apparently high sophistication.167 A 
common example is the way ants follow simple rules to accomplish complex, 
seemingly intelligent tasks. Artificial intelligence pioneer Alan Turing 
understood the utility of emergence and, according to Johnson, contemporary 
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designers of intelligent systems rely on the principles of emergence with 
greater and greater frequency.168 
The prospect of useful but unexpected problem solving by machines 
presents a number of challenges for the law. These challenges are particularly 
acute when combined with embodiment because of the premium the law places 
on physical effects. Yet the earliest puzzles for law have, in a sense, already 
arrived in the form of emergent speech. Indeed, scholars and courts are 
grappling creatively with these issues, without necessarily drawing the broader 
connection to emergence. 
For example, Annemarie Bridy explores the implications of creative 
software for intellectual property: “The law as it is currently configured cannot 
vest ownership of the copyright in a procedurally generated work in the work’s 
author-in-fact, because the work’s author-in-fact—a generative software 
program—has no legal personhood.”169 Tim Wu examines speech generated by 
a machine, arguing that we should apply a functional lens to artificial speech on 
the theory that First Amendment protections do not generally attach to those 
who merely carry information and that “courts do not normally protect 
tools.”170 Stuart Benjamin, in contrast, believes a “fundamental reorientation” 
of First Amendment law may wind up being necessary to accommodate the 
increasing relevance of algorithm-based decisions.171 
Bridy, Wu, Benjamin, and others are looking at what types of speech 
copyright or the Constitution protects. I believe the larger question will turn out 
to be who is liable for the infringement that an emergent system occasions. A 
claim of fault is often where the rubber meets the road. We see the beginnings 
of the infringement issue presented in cases, such as Cartoon Network, LP, 
LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., that turn on whether the user or the automated 
system “copied” a protected work.172 But we can readily imagine more 
fundamental changes. Take, for instance, the difference between expression, 
which is copyrightable, and style, which is not.173 Imagine a musical assistant 
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that helps a musician emulate the style of his favorite guitarist. Now imagine 
that the musician ends up reproducing some part of a real song by that guitarist 
while emulating his style. Assuming the musician had no access to the work 
itself, has there been independent creation? Or does the musical assistant’s 
access to the work for training purposes convey to its user? 
The same questions can be asked of liability for false speech. The popular 
television host Stephen Colbert recently created an account on the social 
network Twitter that automatically swaps in the names of personalities from 
the Fox News Network for movies reviewed on the website Rotten 
Tomatoes.174 “The TV show’s most compelling element of all is [Sarah] Palin,” 
one tweet reads, “wandering the nighttime streets trying to find her lover.”175 
Another tweet implied that Fox News anchor Bill Hemmer took communion 
while intoxicated.176 To the initiated, the account is clearly satirical. Yet even a 
simple system of this kind could generate a claim, which would be defamatory 
if a person uttered it. The law would then face a choice between holding 
someone accountable for a result she did not specifically intend, or permitting 
without recourse what most any observer would take for defamatory or libelous 
speech. 
Emergence in monetary transactions goes even further in affecting the 
world than music or tweets. Tom Win examines the role of high frequency 
trading algorithms in contemporary investment, noting that “cyborg finance” 
challenges certain assumptions around risk management and culpability.177 The 
Securities and Exchange Commission struggles not only with how to prevent 
and address catastrophic market events such as the “Flash Crash” of 2010, as 
Win explores,178 but also with how to deal with learning algorithms that arrive 
at information that would constitute insider trading were it revealed to the 
investor directly.179 Contract law, too, grapples with the minimum 
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intentionality a person must display before she will be held to the terms of a 
transaction negotiated by a software program that she initiated.180 
The prospect of systems that are both emergent and fully, physically 
embodied provides the most acute challenges. The law is generally quicker to 
locate responsibility in the event of physical harm181 and more reticent to allow 
innocent plaintiffs to bear the risk of injuries in the face of a colorable 
defendant. At the same time, the mechanisms by which the law sorts fault 
involve deeply human concepts such as mens rea (criminal law), mutual assent 
(contract), or foreseeability (tort)—all of which are absent where a system is 
built to be unpredictable by design. Several far-flung areas of the law also rely 
on the prospect of control, which in the case of emergent systems is sometimes 
disavowed for good reason. 
Let us start with the “simple” cases—at least simple to spot. Imagine, with 
a string of scholars dating back decades, that an individual purchases a robot 
with emergent properties. The individual assigns the robot a task such as 
cleaning or delivering a package. The robot accomplishes this task in a way 
that, in addition to being unexpected, happens severely to injure a person or 
damages her property. Or consider a real “bot,” designed by artist Darius 
Kazemi, which randomly purchases items on Amazon. Say the bot purchases 
Nazi paraphernalia in France, per the Yahoo! case described in Part I.182 In 
determining culpability, criminal law would look to the state of mind of the 
defendant: did he intend, know, or at least have reason to know his robot would 
hurt the victim or break the law? Tort law would look to foreseeability: should 
the defendant have appreciated the risk of harm and its magnitude, or “fairly 
foreseen” the activity as part of the robot’s assignment?183 
These hypotheticals present, at base, the prospect of a victim who suffers 
a non-natural harm but no perpetrator to whom the law can attribute this harm. 
What scholarship exists on robotics and the law seems to address this particular 
problem. For instance, writing in 1981, Sam Lehman-Wilzig explores various 
models of accountability for artificial beings.184 These include: product 
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liability, dangerous animals, slavery, diminished capacity, children, agency, 
and personhood.185 These categories crop up in several accounts of robot 
responsibility; I imagine one or more occurred to you in reading the previous 
paragraph. Could we not hold a defendant robot owner responsible the second 
time his robot hurt someone, just as we hold him responsible the second time 
his dog bites? Can we categorize robots, like animals, into “roaming” or not for 
purposes of strict liability for intrusion?186 
This set of questions is fascinating and important; the law will need to sort 
out analogies for robots or else create a new category.187 Distinct from what a 
defendant intends or knows, however, there are questions around the very 
prospect and intelligibility of human control over emergent systems. Take the 
concept of res ipsa loquitur in tort law—roughly, the doctrine dispensing with 
the need to show negligence where the “thing speaks for itself.”188 The 
paradigmatic case remains the plaintiff who is struck by a barrel that rolls out 
of a warehouse window.189 The plaintiff need not demonstrate the warehouse 
owner was negligent, because reasonable businesses do not let barrels fly out of 
their property onto the street. 
In addition to fairness, res ipsa has an information-forcing function: the 
warehouse owner knows more about what happened than the plaintiff, and so 
tort law shifts the burden to the defendant to explain what happened.190 The 
doctrine is perhaps less relevant with the advent of modern rules of discovery 
but continues to have life in, for instance, medical malpractice actions where 
the plaintiff was unconscious.191 Importantly, for a plaintiff successfully to 
invoke res ipsa, she must show that the defendant had “exclusive control” over 
the instrumentality of her injury.192 This is an antecedent question: the burden 
does not shift to the defendant in the absence of a showing of exclusive control. 
But a plaintiff’s ability to show that the defendant had “exclusive control” 
is further complicated when robots are involved. Imagine if, rather than a 
barrel, a robot jumped out of the window and injured the plaintiff. If this 
sounds too much like the lead up to a joke (about the “thing” that literally 
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“speaks for itself”), imagine instead that multiple robotics systems played a 
role in diagnosing and treating a patient at a hospital—hospitals being 
demonstrably early adopters of robotics and artificial intelligence, and places 
where res ipsa lives on.193 The various potential configurations of robots in a 
hospital setting deeply complicate the plaintiff’s ability to show exclusive 
control. Perhaps some control resides with the manufacturer or with one or 
more software programmers; perhaps no one effectively has exclusive control 
of a given system. The law would then have to decide whether to take 
exclusive control seriously as a threshold in this context. 
The prospect of emergent behavior also presents interesting questions of 
damages. Recall that an early challenge of cyberlaw involved the prospect of 
electronic trespass to chattels, a doctrine unavailable in the absence of harm.194 
(The harm of electronic trespass to chattels, according to sympathetic courts, 
was the hassle to consumers of wading through unwanted electronic 
messages.195) Robotics presents the prospect that a defendant will, whether 
fully or partially, destroy a valuable emergent trait. A destroys B’s robot that 
cut the hedges a certain, wonderful way. Unlike in the case of animal training, 
B put in no additional labor in enhancing the value of the robot.196 Courts will 
have to determine whether the loss is still market value. 
The questions go beyond civil and criminal liability.197 Craig Allen, a 
maritime law scholar, recently considered whether unmanned submarines with 
autonomous capabilities qualify for the full panoply of rights generally 
afforded vessels in international waters.198 International law premises these 
rights on the ability of a flag state to retain control over the behavior of the 
vessel and crew.199 This has been taken to mean that there are one or more 
people in charge of the vessel who are beholden to the flag nation in the right 
ways. The question whether autonomous systems are beholden to the United 
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States is not (merely) academic: a nation such as China has a strategic incentive 
to disqualify underwater American military equipment that patrols its sea shelf, 
such that international bodies may have to confront the question sooner rather 
than later. 
My purpose here is neither to belittle the important questions others have 
posed around attribution of fault, nor to catalog all of the ways emergence 
stands to challenge the law. Rather, my purpose is to anticipate the broader 
impact of unpredictability by design and to encourage those inclined to study 
robotics and the law to think systematically about emergence. 
3. Social Valence 
Early observers of the Internet remarked upon the predisposition of people 
to think of themselves as “visiting” cyberspace. Dan Hunter argues that this 
tendency is somehow hardwired, an inevitable byproduct of human 
cognition.200 Julie Cohen and others see a danger, at any rate, in over-
physicalizing the virtual.201 Orin Kerr shows more precisely how perspective 
shapes legal outcomes: a court that, against Hunter’s intuition, thinks of the 
Internet as wires and servers might be less likely to allow police officers to 
peruse an online bank account pursuant to a search warrant for the home.202 
Robots also evoke responses in people. There is a robust literature 
suggesting that people are hardwired to react to anthropomorphic technology 
such as robots as though they were interacting with a person.203 The threshold 
for what stimulates this reaction is low: early psychological studies show how 
people attribute social roles to shapes that move around on a page.204 Any robot 
that exists physically in the world (acts) and appears to navigate the world with 
a measure of deliberation (senses and thinks) can invoke a social response. But 
robots are often intentionally designed to be anthropomorphic because it makes 
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them more engaging.205 The effects, moreover, persist over time, and do not 
depend on one’s familiarity with the technology.206 
Thus, to a greater degree than perhaps any technology in history, robots 
have a social valence to people. Psychologist Peter Kahn and colleagues have 
conducted a series of experiments attempting to get a sense of how we think 
about robots. The results have led the team to formulate a startling hypothesis: 
robots may belong in an entirely new “ontological category.”207 Subjects do not 
tend to think about personified robots as alive, but nor do they consider them to 
be objects. Rather, subjects in such studies tend to attribute mental states to 
robots and found it difficult to engage in behavior (e.g., cause discomfort) that 
would be easy if they were dealing with an object.208 The work, funded in large 
part by the National Science Foundation, has lead increasingly to the view that 
no existing ontological category (i.e., distinct category of being) adequately 
captures robotics. As Kahn and colleagues put it:  
For the most part, people are not confused about how to categorize 
most entities in the world. We do not, for example, talk to a brick 
wall and expect it to talk back, nor do we attribute to it mental 
capabilities or think of it as a possible friend. But robots appear 
different.209 
If contemporary psychology is struggling with how to categorize robotics 
given its liminal status between agent and object, it should not surprise us that 
criminal, tort, and other law may as well. Speaking very broadly, the law tends 
to assume a dichotomy between individuals and tools. A barrel rolls out of the 
window of a warehouse and we apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. We 
blame the warehouse owner for her apparently poor safety practices that would 
permit gravity and wood to combine in this way. A man jumps out of the 
window of a warehouse, however, and we ask whether he was acting within the 
scope of his employment.210 A man intends to run down one person with his 
car for excitement and instead runs over another person, we transfer the 
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specificity of this intent.211 Had he intended to run over a fire hydrant, we hold 
him responsible commensurate with a tragic mistake. 
The difficulty of placing robots in one category or another, and our 
tendency in general to behave around social technology as though it were a 
person, threatens to upset this dichotomy and the doctrines it underpins. The 
context of privacy furnishes interesting examples. Generally speaking, 
cyberlaw treats technology as implicating privacy to the extent the technology 
collects, processes, or disseminates information.212 But a robot introduced into 
the home could implicate privacy merely by creating the sense of being 
observed.213 At the same time, robotic surveillance reintroduces certain cues of 
observation that were missing in cyberspace.214 The domestic use of drones for 
surveillance has triggered a uniquely visceral privacy backlash, likely due to 
cultural associations around robots.215 
Courts, juries, prosecutors, and various other legal actors will have to 
decide, in innumerate contexts, whether to sort anthropomorphic technology as 
having social valence or not. One of the main drivers of medical malpractice 
claims is, reportedly, the frequency and character of the patient’s interactions 
with the doctor.216 Hospitals accordingly design and implement protocols that 
ensure doctor-patient contact in advance of surgery. They do not think about 
whether the patient should “meet” the scalpel. As robotic surgery becomes 
more popular, hospitals may develop protocols around discussing the hardware. 
Administrators will face incentives to investigate, for instance, whether 
introducing the patient to the robot beforehand leads to a greater or lesser 
likelihood of suit. Savvy manufactures may even try to negotiate terms with the 
hospital to dictate how the technology is characterized to patients (e.g., no 
names, no gender) in a bid to influence the patient not to pursue the 
manufacturer as the primary defendant. 
Research out of Stanford University suggests that people feel differently 
about tasks they perform through robots depending on the design.217 The more 
anthropomorphic the robot, the more subjects tended to share blame with the 
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robot for failure and praise for success.218 Consider how this affects decision 
making by officials in the context of policing—another arena in which robots 
are becoming prevalent.219 When a police officer hits a citizen with her car or 
shoots a citizen with her gun, other police are out the very next day driving cars 
and carrying weapons. If a police robot—particularly a humanoid one—were 
involved in a fatal accident, we might not expect to see the robot or a similar 
model on patrol for some time.220 
Then there are the risks humans will foreseeably take on behalf of 
machines. Anecdotal accounts and a 2013 study out of the University of 
Washington suggest that soldiers’ attachments to robots in the battlefield could 
affect battle outcomes due to risks the soldier is or is not willing to take 
regarding the machine.221 We should expect to see this dynamic on the 
domestic front. It is, of course, conceivable that an individual will risk herself 
for an object she cherishes—but such behavior tends to be discounted as 
idiosyncratic.222 And it is a matter of black letter tort law that, while danger 
invites rescue, plaintiffs will not be compensated for injuries sustained rescuing 
their possessions (including pets).223 But can we ask the same of plaintiffs who 
form deep and predictable attachments to machines? Moreover, to return again 
to damages, how do we compensate losses for objects with not only objective 
sentimental value, but with an emotional attachment the marketplace cannot 
replicate?224 
Robotics may also trigger a broader role for the concept of moral harm in 
the law. Moral harm refers to the harm that accrues to the actor, rather than 
another victim or society, by committing an immoral act.225 The theory is that 
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certain objectionable but otherwise victimless behavior still morally 
compromises the actor behind it.226 Kate Darling explores whether the way 
humans seem hardwired to react to anthropomorphic machines suggests the 
need to extend a limited set of legal rights to social robots, or at least 
prohibitions against abusing them, even where no one thinks of them as alive or 
sentient at a rational level.227 We may not want to be the kind of society that 
tolerates cruelty to an entity we think of as quasi-human. Darling points out 
that we may want to protect citizens from the pain that even watching such 
abuse may occasion.228 At a more practical level, there is a demonstrable link 
between willingness to abuse animals and to abuse people—so much so that 
some jurisdictions require officers responding to animal abuse allegations to 
call in child welfare services if there are kids in the house.229 One could readily 
imagine pressure to study the correlation with social robotics. 
In short, we may be on the cusp of creating a new category of legal 
subject, halfway between person and object. And I believe the law will have to 
make room for this category.230 
III. 
THE PATH OF CYBERLAW: FROM INTERNET TO ROBOTICS 
To summarize the argument so far, transformative technologies tend to 
have essential qualities that drive the legal and policy conversations that attend 
them. The Internet, with its emphasis on connection, community, and control, 
generated a box of puzzles concerning the nature of commercial, creative, and 
civic communication, and the powerful role of intermediaries. These questions, 
while in a sense as important as ever, have faded into the discursive 
background by virtue of their familiarity and the efforts of academics and 
policymakers. Meanwhile, new technologies ascend, requiring a markedly 
different emphasis. The essential, distinguishing facets of robotics portend a 
new set of challenges centered around embodying data, harnessing 
unpredictability, and disentangling person from instrument. 
 
 226. But see id. (calling into question the coherence of moral harm on the basis that 
consummating the immoral act is evidence that the agent was already morally corrupted). 
 227. See Kate Darling, Extending Legal Rights to Social Robots, in ROBOT LAW (Ryan Calo et 
al. eds.) (forthcoming 2015), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2044797. 
 228. Id.  
 229. And vice versa. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 609.650 (2013) (“The Legislative Assembly 
finds that . . . [t]here is a clear link between animal cruelty and crimes of domestic violence, including 
child abuse.”). 
 230. Benjamin Wittes and Jane Chong offer a second sense in which person and thing are being 
blended. They note that people increasingly embed technology into their daily lives, becoming in a 
sense “cyborgs,” with repercussions for at least privacy law. See BENJAMIN WITTES & JANE CHONG, 
BROOKINGS INST., OUR CYBORG FUTURE: LAW AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS (2014), 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Reports/2014/09/cyborg-future-law-policy-
implications/cyborg_future_law_policy_implications_FINAL2.pdf?la=en. 
550 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  103:513 
The question naturally arises as to how these new experiences will affect 
law and legal institutions. Will new institutions be necessary to deal with the 
issues robotics and artificial intelligence raise? How should legal academics 
and others engage with robotics? Even accepting for argument’s sake that the 
advent of this technology will raise issues across many different legal 
disciplines, do we gain anything by drawing lines around robotics and artificial 
intelligence and treating them separately in the first place? If so, should a 
discipline such as cyberlaw expand to host this conversation or does robotics 
presage the formation of a separate community of academics, government, 
industry, and other stakeholders? 
I turn to these questions in this final Section. I discuss what it means for a 
technology like robotics to be “exceptional” in the legal sense, such that it is 
sensible to examine the technology separately in the first place. I canvass 
various possible definitions of exceptionalism and settle on a moderate 
conception that holds technologies to be exceptional if the best reconciliation 
of societal values leads to systemic changes to law or institutions. I then show 
how robotics may occasion such changes. I explore how robotics could cause a 
variety of legal areas to move toward the risk management model now seen in 
financial and environmental regulation, for example.231 And I show why 
robotics may join railroads, radios, vaccines, and other technologies in 
occasioning a standalone regulatory institution. 
I close by examining the advantages and disadvantages of thinking of 
robotics as a separate field of study from cyberlaw. Robotics shares with the 
Internet a number of constituent technologies (e.g., computers and networks) 
and important issues (e.g., intermediary liability and privacy). It is hard to miss 
how many of the handful of important works at the intersection of law and 
robotics have come from scholars who also research the Internet. And in the 
past twenty years, cyberlaw has developed some edifying approaches to 
technology—the attention to metaphor, for instance, and a kind of 
interdisciplinary pragmatism—that could not but inform a law of robotics.232 
But there are key differences between robotics and the Internet that impede a 
straightforward application of those principles and methods. On balance, I see 
the utility of pursuing law and robotics as its own discipline with the lessons of 
cyberlaw firmly in mind. 
A. Exceptionalism, Generally 
The basic idea of exceptionalism is that a person, place, object, or concept 
is qualitatively different from others in the same basic category. Thus, 
 
 231. See generally Daniel A. Farber, Uncertainty, 99 GEO. L.J. 901 (2011) (noting role of 
uncertainty and risk management in economic and environmental regulation). 
 232. Cf. Neil M. Richards & William D. Smart, How Should the Law Think About Robots?, in 
ROBOT LAW (Ryan Calo et al. eds.) (forthcoming 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2263363 (noting the 
likely importance of metaphor to robotics law); see also infra Part III.C. 
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American exceptionalism represents the (contested) idea that the United States 
is unlike any other nation in existence or history.233 I raise the concept of 
exceptionalism because, if it turns out that America, or the Internet, or robots, 
differs in meaningful respects from other places, technologies, or legal 
domains, then perhaps we should engage in a standalone analysis. If, on the 
other hand, America is just modern day Athens, then treating it separately 
likely impoverishes our understanding.234 Of course, not all differences are 
equally meaningful. Obviously, the United States is different from, and similar 
to, England in a variety of ways. We need to determine what differences 
matter. For our purposes, what differences between robots and previous 
technologies matter to law and legal analysis? 
Robots would already meet a very weak form of exceptionalism that turns 
on the perceived necessity of new laws: dozens of states have robot-specific 
laws on the books.235 The early Internet exceptionalists, however, adopted what 
might be described as a “strong” position. They hold that the Internet 
constitutes a separate sovereign that no contemporary legal system may 
govern.236 On this view, the Internet joins, for instance, maritime law as one of 
the few sources of novel and distinct rules and institutions.237 Presumably few 
would contest that maritime law should be treated differently—that, rather, 
every course in tort, property, or contract should instead have a unit related to 
how it works on the open sea. Some think cyberlaw should be its own body of 
law. 
At the opposite extreme are those who see next to no meaningful 
difference between the Internet and any other technology. In what has become 
cyberlaw lore, judge and professor Frank Easterbrook once took the 
inauspicious occasion of an inaugural cyberlaw conference keynote to throw 
cold water on the entire enterprise. He famously likened studying Internet law 
to studying the law of the horse.238 Sure, many cases involve horses as a factual 
matter. Disputes arise when horses are bought and sold, cared for by 
veterinarians, or tend to kick people. But “[a]ny effort to collect these strands 
into a course on ‘The Law of the Horse’ is doomed to be shallow and to miss 
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unifying principles.”239 For this set, whom David Post calls the 
“unexceptionalists,”240 talking in terms of an Internet law obscures much more 
than it reveals. You see this position implicit in the recent work of Tim Wu, an 
early critic of strong Internet exceptionalism.241 For Wu, various 
communications technologies follow a similar arch from free and open to 
closed and proprietary that reflect certain diachronic political and market 
commitments.242 This insight only emerges by studying the technologies 
together.243 
There are one or more intermediate positions. Clearly a transformative 
technology like the Internet changes the available facts, and hence the doctrine, 
to a degree. Lawrence Lessig came to see the Internet as, in a sense, 
unexceptional, but believes the technology still reveals certain ambiguities that 
were “latent” in the law all along.244 Studying cyberlaw becomes useful 
because, in doing so, we confront and hopefully resolve tensions in the law we 
had not realized existed. Some of the conclusions Lessig draws on this basis 
feel radical, like the suggestion that the private firms that control the 
architecture of the Internet might be subject to the First Amendment.245 But at 
base his project is one of translation, where he applies existing principles to 
new technologies.246 
In the spirit of these intermediate positions,247 I too propose a moderate 
conception of legal exceptionalism for purposes of assessing robotics. A 
technology is not exceptional merely because it creates one or more small 
changes in the law, or because it reveals, at the margins, that an existing 
interpretation of a particular doctrine is incomplete. By the same token, a 
technology need not occasion a literal breakdown in the rule of law or prove 
the source of entirely novel doctrines to qualify. Rather, a technology is 
exceptional when its introduction into the mainstream requires a systematic 
change to the law or legal institutions in order to reproduce, or if necessary 
displace, an existing balance of values. 
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Such a conception invites a number of candidates for legally exceptional 
technology. Negligence in tort was not invented to deal with the railroad. But 
the introduction of this technology arguably catalyzed the rapid and systemic 
uptake of negligence as a legal measure of liability.248 There existed a federal 
department dedicated to health and human services prior to the development of 
the small pox vaccine, but the need to mobilize this technology helped launch a 
central pillar of the modern administrative state.249 In 1926, the radio was 
sufficiently novel and pervasive that President Calvin Coolidge signed into law 
an act creating a standalone entity—the Federal Radio Commission—that 
eventually evolved into the Federal Communications Commission.250 These 
major recalibrations of laws or institutions were perceived as necessary to 
preserve human values in the face of new technology251—to keep the law doing 
what the law does “when it does work.”252 
B. Robot Exceptionalism 
Under the conception I have articulated, a technology is exceptional if it 
invites a systemic change to laws or legal institutions in order to preserve or 
rebalance established values. There are several candidates for systematic 
changes robotics could herald. I have alluded to the prospect of a third legal 
category between person and instrument—a “quasi res” intended to capture 
technology with social valence. Where people have difficulty categorizing 
something as being more object- or person-like, the law may similarly struggle. 
One option is ad hoc: treating a robot as more like a person in the context of 
damages or transferred intent but not agency law or the law of the sea. But even 
so, the temptation will be for courts and scholars to draw connections between 
the areas of law that countenance social objects. 
This Section canvasses a few other candidates for how the law may 
change systemically in light of the qualities of robotics I have described in Part 
II. The candidates—lower mens rea in crime, risk over foreseeability in tort, 
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and the prospect of a new administrative body—are not meant to be exhaustive; 
others may have equally viable ideas for how the law might change. The 
candidates do, however, aim to get beyond usual discussions of robotics and 
law, which tend to dwell exclusively on the prospect of robot agency. 
1. Mens Rea 
One change that the qualities of embodiment and emergence could herald 
is an increased role for strict liability in criminal law. Today, criminal law is 
skeptical of strict liability253—American society reserves strict liability for 
particularly sensitive contexts (e.g., sex with a minor) or lesser infractions with 
low stakes (e.g., traffic infractions). But as individuals and institutions 
increasingly leverage robotics with emergent properties, society could witness 
a barrage of activity that would be illegal were it carried out or even sanctioned 
by people. 
The prospect of punishing corporations has already confronted courts and 
lawmakers with the problem that robots have “no soul to damn [and] no body 
to kick” when they violate the law.254 But here we lack even the sense that a 
wrong, or even a mistake, was committed in the first instance.255 No one 
expected, much less intended, the technology to do what it did.256 And yet we 
have a victim who suffered real harm. The law could plausibly respond by 
creating a parasitic misdemeanor, akin to harboring or obstruction,257 that 
punishes a defendant for putting into play a technology physically capable of 
causing a specific harm where that harm is actually realized. Rationales for 
such a category could include vindicating an injury in the eyes of society and 
providing a moral and pragmatic check on overuse of a potentially dangerous 
technology without justification. A category of emergent theft or homicide 
would itself represent change in the state of jurisprudence. 
2. Foreseeability 
In the realm of tort law, the prospect of truly emergent behavior may 
herald a lesser or altered role for foreseeability. Every law student knows that 
the actions of tortfeasors must not only be negligent, but must proximately 
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cause the injury. Showing proximate (sometimes “legal”) causation is largely a 
function of whether the injury was foreseeable to the tortfeasor. Foreseeability 
remains a necessary ingredient even where liability is otherwise “strict” (i.e., 
where no showing of negligence by the plaintiff is necessary to recovery).258 
There will be situations, particularly as emergent systems interact with one 
another, wherein otherwise useful technology will legitimately surprise all 
involved. Should these systems prove deeply useful to society, as many 
envision, some other formulation than foreseeability may be necessary to 
assess liability. 
As a consequence, we may see a broader role for risk mitigation within 
the law. The combination of data promiscuity mixed with the capacity to do 
physical harm can make unpacking liability impractical.259 The difficulty in 
predicting emergent behavior in robotic systems compounds this problem, 
particularly where many systems are operating in the world together. Some of 
the early warnings of problems with artificial “agents”—a book listed for 
millions of dollars,260 for instance, or the 2010 market flash crash261—resulted 
from the interaction of two or more software programs responding 
unpredictably to one another. Of course, risk or “uncertainty” management is 
hardly new to law—we see it in environmental and financial regulation, for 
instance.262 The focus of this body of law and literature is on setting defaults 
and liability rules that keep risk at tolerable levels.263 Robotics could result in 
the far greater deployment of these approaches such that they become a part of 
the everyday life of the law. 264 These or other doctrines may expand or shift 
with the ascendance of robotics. 
3. Administrative Law 
Finally, robotics may change public institutions. To date, federal agencies 
have divvied up robotics on the basis of existing categories—spatial 
distinctions such as airspace or highway, or activity contexts such as health and 
work. Congress charged the Federal Aviation Administration with the task of 
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integrating drones into domestic airspace.265 The National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration has developed guidance around driverless cars.266 The 
Food and Drug Administration approves robots for use in medicine.267 The 
Occupational Health and Safety Administration issued directives regarding the 
safe use of industrial robotics dating back to 1987.268 
As I argue elsewhere, however, we should not reflexively discount the 
prospect of a more unified agency for robotics, something like a Federal 
Robotics Commission (FRC) to deal with the novel human experiences 
robotics occasions.269 New agencies do form from time to time. Although many 
of the household-name federal agencies have remained the same over the 
previous decades, there has also been considerable change. Agencies 
restructure, as we saw with the formation of the Department of Homeland 
Security.270 New agencies, such as the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 
arise to address new or newly acute challenges posed by big events or changes 
in behavior. 271 
Technology has repeatedly played a meaningful part in the formation of 
new agencies. For instance, the advent of radio made it possible to reach 
thousands of people at once with entertainment, news, and emergency 
information. The need to manage the impact of radio on society in turn led to 
the formation in 1926 of the Federal Radio Commission. The Radio 
Commission itself morphed into the Federal Communications Commission as 
forms of mass media proliferated and is today charged with a variety of tasks 
related to communications devices and networks. The advent of the train 
required massive changes to national infrastructure, as it physically connected 
disparate communities and consistently sparked, sometimes literally, harm to 
people and property. We formed the Federal Railroad Administration in 
response. This agency now lives within the U.S. Department of Transportation, 
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though the Department itself grew out of the ascendance of rail and later the 
highway. The introduction of the vaccine and the attendant need to organize 
massive outreach to Americans helped turn a modest U.S. Marine Hospital 
Service into the United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and 
sowed the seeds for the Department of Health and Human Services.272 And, of 
course, there would be no Federal Aviation Administration without the 
experiences and challenges of human flight. 
Unlike the previous examples, the Internet has no standalone federal 
agency that regulates it. Rather, multiple bodies with unique configurations set 
Internet policy at a technical and civil level: the Internet Engineering Task 
Force and the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, in 
particular, represent quasi-public institutions with responsibility for 
maintaining the architecture and protocols of the Internet even today. As 
Michael Froomkin and David Post each explore, this unique governance 
mechanism is perhaps the Internet’s most interesting public legacy,273 making 
it among the more exceptional technologies in recent memory.274 
Ostensibly, the reason legislatures create, and courts defer to, agencies in 
the first place is that agencies foster justice and efficiency through the 
development of expertise.275 But each of the three essential qualities of robotics 
requires a deeper examination by policymakers than current configurations 
allow. I alluded to the challenges the Securities and Exchange Commission 
faces around algorithmic trading.276 A few years ago, the car manufacturer 
Toyota faced a class action lawsuit alleging that a software malfunction led its 
cars to accelerate unexpectedly—an analog to the problem of embodied data. 
The question proved so complex that the Department of Transportation had to 
enlist National Aeronautics and Space Administration engineers with expertise 
in computer-controlled electronic systems, electromagnetic interference, and 
software integrity to write the report.277 
At some point, it is inefficient for an agency to develop expertise in the 
complexities of embodiment and emergence, and thus, the proposed FRC could 
routinely assist officials, states, and other agencies—from the Department of 
Justice to the U.S. Copyright Office—to grapple with the essential qualities of 
robotics. The agency could build its own expertise around the effects of social 
technology on human behavior and help develop standards for the industry and 
guidance for prosecutors and courts. Moreover, were we to decide that 
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insurance is the best way to manage the risks that attend robotics,278 or that the 
technology should be registered in some way,279 the FRC could coordinate such 
efforts. 
In short, the essential qualities of robotics support the above and likely 
other candidates for a moderate legal exceptionalism. They are different 
enough to occasion broad, systemic changes to the law—to at least as great a 
degree as the Internet. 
C. What Cyberlaw Might Teach 
Even accepting that robotics will prove exceptional in the right sense, 
there remains the question of how academics should configure robotics and the 
law as a field. Should interested scholars working in a variety of disciplines 
such as tort, criminal law, contracts, and taxation come together around a new 
discipline of robotics and the law? Or should cyberlaw scholars engaged with 
today’s transformative technologies simply pivot with the times? The answer is 
a bit of both. 
A transformative technology such as the Internet or robotics matters 
insofar as it changes the range of human experiences in ways that undermine 
the balance the law hopes to strike. The possibilities the Internet or robotics 
engender force the law to confront assumptions, some of which are still held to 
be true, others of which end up requiring reexamination. The question of 
whether it is fair to hold a person in one state accountable for effects in another 
when she has never set foot there, owns nothing, and did not even specifically 
target the population, had not really come up before the Internet. Hence, the 
law made an assumption about “minimum contacts” and the importance and 
meaning of “availing” oneself of a jurisdiction that looks different today 
because of the Internet. 
Where the same disrupted assumptions obtain across multiple areas of 
law—criminal and tort, for instance, or copyright—then it arguably makes 
sense to treat together the technology (or set of technologies) responsible for 
the disruption. How criminal law integrates the prospect of victims without 
perpetrators will inform inquiries into the propriety of an “actual malice” 
standard in the face of robot speech or the coherence of foreseeability in tort. 
Moreover, it will end up that the same sorts of essential qualities of robotics—
on this account, embodiment, emergence, and social valence—trigger related 
concerns in distinct areas of law. 
Parts I and II hoped to establish that robotics has a different set of 
essential qualities than the Internet and hence raises a distinct set of legal and 
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policy concerns. This would suggest treating robotics separately. At the same 
time, however, there are considerable parallels. Robotics shares with the 
Internet a number of constituent technologies (e.g., computers and networks) 
and important issues (e.g., intermediary liability and privacy). And in the past 
twenty years, cyberlaw has developed some edifying approaches to technology 
that could not help but inform a law of robotics. 
The first insight is that robotics, no less than computers, will be subject to 
regulation by code. I mentioned above the claim that cyberlaw is really a “law 
of the horse” (i.e., a contrived and unhelpful umbrella term for a disparate set 
of issues that happen to touch upon the Internet). In 1999, one of the most 
influential figures in cyberlaw, Lawrence Lessig, replied directly to Judge 
Easterbrook’s comments.280 For Lessig, cyberlaw illuminates the entire law by 
revealing certain assumptions about what counts as public space and what it 
means to “regulate.” What cyberlaw might teach is that the architecture of a 
system like the Internet, no less than law (and sometimes more so), can 
regulate human behavior. Lessig joins Joel Reidenberg and others in observing 
that software itself (the “code” of the Internet) amounts to a regulatory tool.281 
By controlling how and when people can communicate with one another 
online, governments and companies constrain human behavior just as 
effectively as laws.282 Thus, for instance, the state can make copying and 
sharing digital music unlawful, or the content owner could make copying and 
sharing the files close to physically impossible.283 Part I groups this lesson 
under the heading of “control.” 
The second insight has to do with the importance of analogy in legal 
reasoning, including in technology. Lessig’s assertion that “code is law” 
changed the way many talk about Internet regulation.284 But an equally 
influential concept in cyberlaw, particularly where it comes to the direction of 
actual Internet case law, is the role analogy plays.285 Common law courts look 
to whether a given digital activity is “like” an activity for which there are 
already rules. Legal, policy, and academic debates become battles over the 
proper analogy or metaphor. A court might ask whether email is more like a 
postcard or a sealed letter for purposes of determining its level of protection 
under the Fourth Amendment.286 A lawmaker might ponder whether 
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cryptography is best understood as “speech” before deciding whether and how 
to regulate it.287 
Although I conclude that robotics should be treated separately, it would be 
wise to draw deeply from Lessig and other cyberlaw scholars. Both the 
prospect of control by code and the importance of analogy remain highly 
relevant to the context of robotics.288 The degree to which the government or 
industry can control the architecture of robots will strongly influence academic 
and policy analysis. But in addition, a familiarity with the interplay between 
code and law could prove helpful in fashioning responses to the prospect of 
uncertain and destructive behavior by software. A puzzle over how software 
constrains human behavior can expand to encompass how law and code can 
constrain robot behavior. 
The Food and Drug Administration already embraces analogy where, for 
instance, it approves surgical robots on an expedited basis because of the 
resemblance to laparoscopic surgery.289 Existing and surely future work asks 
whether a robot is “like” an animal or a child or a slave.290 And, as alluded to 
above, cyberlaw scholars puzzled extensively over how people think about 
cyberspace, and in particular, the perception that we travel to websites. We are 
at least as hardwired to treat anthropomorphic machines as though they were 
social. A familiarity with the influence of mental models on consumer, citizen, 
and official behavior could help cyberlaw unravel the distinction between 
person and instrument this tendency occasions. 
Cyberlaw has, in short, developed a methodological toolkit that will be of 
obvious use to robotics law. But perhaps of greater relevance is the cyberlaw 
tradition of melding legal and technical expertise. The “interdisciplinary 
pragmatism” that grew up around cyberlaw cannot help but inform a robust 
dialogue as to the proper legal and policy infrastructure for robotics. 
While Judge Easterbrook’s “law of the horse” is legendary, less remarked 
was his admonition that lawyers should not interpret technology because they 
do not understand it. “I regret to report,” said Judge Easterbrook, “that no one 
at this Symposium is going to win a Nobel Prize any time soon for advances in 
computer science. . . . Put together two fields about which you know little and 
get the worst of both worlds.”291 
Here, Judge Easterbrook was clearly wrong. Cyberlaw today is a deeply 
interdisciplinary enterprise, full of meaningful collaboration across a wide 
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variety of training.292 Many of its brightest scholars and advocates take great 
pains to follow technology and social science. Not only have lawyers risen to 
the occasion of learning about technology and its effects, but the community 
around cyberlaw has also spurred technologists to develop a deeper 
understanding of law and policy.293 The solution space, meanwhile, inevitably 
contains not just legal but also technological prescriptions—so much so that 
critics of cyberlaw bemoan its “technological solutionism.”294 We are not 
talking here of an intellectual fascination with comparative theory, but a 
practical agenda of looking across disciplines to solve real problems. 
There can be no deep understanding of the interaction between robotics 
and the law without the hard fought interdisciplinary pragmatism that grew up 
around cyberlaw. The essential qualities of robotics implicate computer and 
social science to a degree even greater than the Internet. Whether at 
conferences or hearings, in papers or in draft legislation, the legally and 
technically savvy will need to be in constant conversation. We are, as it 
happens, already seeing this: interdisciplinary collaborations are cropping up 
around driverless car and drone regulation.295 Events such as the annual 
robotics law and policy conference We Robot attract nearly as many roboticists 
as lawyers. As a person with the occasional front row seat to these efforts, I can 
tell you that the rapidity and seamlessness of these efforts owes a deep debt to 
cyberlaw. 
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In short, the essential qualities of robotics suggest a separate academic 
inquiry from cyberlaw, one that reflects the differences between the two 
technologies and the new human experiences they support. New juridical 
insights are likely to emerge from the study of robots to complement the legal 
innovation the Internet made possible. But we should not be starting from 
scratch. Decades of cyberlaw scholarship surfaced lessons to the study of any 
new technology, let alone one with as many commonalities as robotics. These 
include the role of analogy in common law decision making around 
technology, the propensity of scholars and courts to embrace certain metaphors, 
the prospect that architecture constrains, and, in particular, the importance of 
collaboration across disciplines. Few important issues exist in contemporary 
society that can be solved by reference to law alone or to any one discipline. 
CONCLUSION 
The ascendance of the Internet brought great changes to society and 
triggered a movement among legal academics known as cyberlaw. The themes 
of this literature reflect the essential qualities of the Internet—connectivity, 
community, and control. Even as the law adapts to these changes, technology 
has rushed forward. The same government and hobbyists that developed the 
Internet, and the handful of private companies that have come to characterize it, 
have begun a significant shift toward robotics and artificial intelligence. The 
legislative bodies that wrote Internet-specific laws in the late 1990s now draft 
bills about drones and driverless cars. 
Robotics, meanwhile, has a different set of essential qualities—
embodiment, emergence, and social valence. The coming years will 
accordingly be marked by a new and distinct struggle, one in which academics 
and policymakers strive to develop a theoretical and doctrinal infrastructure 
capable of integrating this exciting new technology. The best way forward is to 
open new pathways of understanding without discarding the knowledge and 
methods cyberlaw has carefully collected. 
I want to return briefly to Herbert Simon in closing. Simon recognized the 
utility of those closest to an emerging technology speculating about its impact 
on society.296 But he also appreciated that his thoughts were necessarily a 
beginning, not an end, of public participation.297 Early interpreters of the 
Internet made the same caveat.298 My deepest hope for this project is that many 
words will follow it. Perhaps I have underestimated the pace at which robotics 
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will evolve, or overestimated the impact the technology will have. Perhaps I 
have misdiagnosed robots’ essential qualities or chosen an unwise path 
forward. But robotics will transform our lives in ways prosaic and profound. 
How the law reacts is up to us. 
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